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The Law of Freedom (James 1:25): Light from Early Exegesis 
Matt Jackson-McCabe  
Niagara University  
In James I:2 I-25, a law that is both "perfect" and "of freedom" is closely 
correlated with an "implanted logos" (EIJ¢uw; A6yo<;) that "is able to save souls."; 
Among the earliest extant interpretations of this "implanted logos" is that of an 
anonymous Greek exegete, preserved in the catenae attributed to Theophylactus and 
Oecumenius. This interpreter identified it as that which makes one "rational," and 
associated it, further, particularly with the human ability to discern between "the better 
and the worse.";; Though using different language, the 1zth century Syriac exegete 
Dionysius bar Salibi interpreted James's logos in a remarkably similar fashion. "God 
implanted [it] into nature," he writes, "so that it should love good things and have an 
aversion to bad things." Dionysius, moreover, identified the "implanted logos" itself as 
"natural law." Accordingly, the "perfect law of freedom," he states elsewhere, is a "law 
which God from the beginning placed in human nature.,;;, 
Given that there is nothing to suggest any literary relationship between Dionysius 
and this anonymous Greek exegete,iv the similarities in their interpretations are rather 
remarkable. Equally remarkable is the fact that this ancient line of interpretation, 
forwarded independently by two different exegetes, has been all but ignored in critical 
discussions of James. By and large, the fact that Jamesv speaks ofthe "implanted logos" 
in ways that are scarcely typical of Stoic discussions of human reason has been thought to 
preclude its interpretation as human reason or natural law. The description of this logos 
as something that can be "heard" and "done"- and particularly which can "save souls" -
has generally been taken as a clear indication that the Christian author of James refers 
rather to "the gospel. "Vi As one interpreter has put it, "that the gospel, if obeyed, is able to 
save a person's self, is certainly a truism of the N(ew] T[estament]."VI' Consequently, the 
rationale for this ancient interpretation has not been investigated. 
lf critical study of the New Testament has taught us anything, however, it has 
taught us that such claims about "truisms of the New Testament" are tricky business. The 
New Testament itself- not to speak of the early Christian literature more generally-
includes a great deal of theological variety. In fact, it is my contention that it is precisely 
the interpretation ofthese early exegetes that holds the key to understanding James's 
correlation of "implanted logos" and the "perfect law of freedom." ln this paper I will 
show, first, that the similarities in the interpretations of these two early exegetes results 
from the fact that both read laJlleS in light of the Stoic theory that human reason, which in 
its perfect form as "right reason" constitutes natural law, develops out of an initial 
endowment of"implanted preconceptions" (EJ.l~UTOI rrpoA~IjiE15) of basic moral 
categories like 'good' and 'bad'. Secondly, I will show that the term "implanted" is used 
to describe either human reason or a natural law it comprises repeatedly in ancient 
literature informed by this Stoic theory. Finally, I will argue that James itself has drawn 
on this concept ofnatural law. 
Human Reason and Natural Lawviii 
The heart of the Stoic theory of natural law is the identification of logos as the 
true, divine law. This identification is twofold, as is the Stoic logos itself. It refers on one 
hand to the divine, cosmic logos that permeates the universe and represents the law and 
constitution of the great "World City." On the other hand, it refers to the logos that is 
definitive of human nature, and particularly to the "right reason" ofthe sage- the human 
being whose logos confonns to the cosmic logos, and who is thus counted among the 
citizens of the World City. It is the latter identification that is of primary concern for our 
purposes. In order to clarify why, we'll need to take a brief detour into the Stoic account 
of the development of human reason. 
According to the Stoics, the human animal is born with only a potential logos. A 
person is not rational in the proper sense of the term until around age seven, when his or 
her logos becomes fully mature. Chrysippus defined the mature logos itself as an 
",assemblage" of conceptions (EVVOia!) and preconceptions (rrpoA~\jJEIS"). Prior to the 
maturation of the logos at around age seven, however, human beings are incapable of 
forming EVVOia\ in- the technical, Stoic sense; that is to say, we cannot acquire the sort of 
refined and well-defined concepts that require systematic intellectual inquiry. At this 
early stage, rather, the human intellect forms only preconceptions: general notions that 
arise naturally, simply as a result of the human mind's natural tendency to organize 
experience into abstract concepts. Thus, even prior to the time when a human is capable 
of the type of intellectual inquiry that leads to geometric equations or nuanced 
philosophical concepts, she or he nonetheless does work with general concepts such as 
'blue' or 'hot' which result simply from repeated exposure to things that exhibit these 
characteristics. At this stage, then, the still-developing logos is an assemblage of 
preconceptions alone. 
While all preconceptions, by definition, arise naturally apart from any conscious 
intellectual effort, the Stoics also posited a particular category of preconceptions that 
were "naturally" occurring in a stillmore specialized sense. The Stoics argued that 
providential Nature designed every animal with an impulse toward self-nreservation. nne! 
this impulse entailed an i1mate tendency to seek out things that are helpful to its 
constitution and to avoid things that are harmful to it. The human animal is different from 
other animals, however, in that it has, by virtue of its rational tendency, the ability to 
conceptualize this distinction. The human animal, therefore, is understood to have an 
innate disposition to form concepts like 'good' and 'bad'. Unlike concepts such as 'blue' 
or 'hot', that is, concepts like 'good' and 'bad' are thought to arise regardless ofthe 
nature ofone's experiences; they represent, indeed, an evaluative disposition that one 
brings to one's experiences. These innate concepts of 'good' and 'bad'- the existence of 
which are foundational for the Stoic view of the Goal as "life in accord with nature" - are 
called "implanted preconceptions" (EIJ~UTOI rrpoAr]ljJEIS'), and are commonly described 
as the "seeds" of knowledge or virtue. 
Given the Stoic definition of the logos itself as an "assemblage" of conceptions 
and preconceptions, it is not surprising that these "implanted preconceptions" are closely 
correlated with the inchoate logos with which human beings are naturally endowed- and 
which will ultimately (ideally) develop into the "right reason" of the sage that comprises 
natural law. ix It is against this theoretical background that we are to understand the 
interpretation of James's "implanted logos" with reference to the human tendency to 
make ethical distinctions by both of our early exegetes. Our anonymous Greek exegete, 
as we have seen, identifies James's logos explicitly as human reason in this connection. 
Equally striking is its identification simply as natural law by Dionysius. In fact, this 
theory of "implanted preconceptions" of good and bad was associated especially closely 
with the Stoic theory of natural law. 
Logos and Natural Law as "Implanted" 
Underlying the interpretations of both our early exegetes is an assumption that the 
term EIJ¢UTOS' can be used in this philosophical context not only to describe the 
implanted preconceptions, but also the potential logos or natural law itself that these 
preconceptions comprise. In fact, such usage is found in a variety of ancient works that 
deal particularly with the subject of natural law. In what follows, I will briefly discuss the 
most significant examples. 
Cicero. 
Perhaps the most significant instance is found in Cicero’s On Laws,by far the 
most complete extant source for the Stoic theory of law. The initial definition of law 
presented in this important work is found in 1.18-19. “The most learned men,” Cicero 
writes, defined law as “highest reason, implanted in nature” (summaratio insita in 
natura). More precisely, he immediately clarifies, “this reason, whenfirmlyfixed and 
fully developed in the human mind, is Law.” This latter clarification seems to imply that 
the phrase ratio insita connotes specificallya less than “fully developed” ralio. And 
Cicero in fact makes it quite clear elsewhere in the treatise that the process that ultimately 
(ideally) leads to the “right reason” of the sage begins with a natural endowment of 
implanted preconceptions.’ Thus, just as the inchoate reason with which humans are born 
is comprised of “implanted preconceptions,”so too can inchoate reason itself be 
described as “implanted reason” (ratio insita). 
Significantly, Cicero attributes this definition of law to aprior source. The 
unfortunately fragmentary nature of the actual Stoic sources themselves makes it difficult 
to h o w  what, precisely, that source was. But while there remains some disagreement on 
this question, it is recognized on all hands that his source was Greek.“ It can therefore 
safely be concluded that, behind Cicero’s definition of law in terms of ratio insita, there 
lies a Greek definition of law in terms of ip$UTo~hdyos. In fact, analogous terminology 
is found in a number of other ancient works, composed in Greek, which also rely on the 
Stoic theory of law. 
The Apostolic ConstituHons 
Most striking in this connection is a fourth century Christian compilation known 
as the Apostolic Constitutions. Books 7 and 8 of this work contain a collection of prayers 
that assume the theory of law found in Cicero's On Laws.';; Here, however, this theory is 
incorporated into the biblical accounts of the creation of humanity by the God of the 
Jewish scriptures, and his gift of a divine law to Israel through Moses. The Torah, 
according to this work, is a "written law" (VO!lOS' ypmno5) given as an "aid" to the 
"natural law" (¢uotKOS' vo~.105), which humans had corrupted.';;; This latter, strikingly, is 
described repeatedly in the work as the Ef.I¢UT05 vo~J05 - the "implanted law"- and is 
said to have been given to the first man, in Eden, "so that, from within himself, he should 
have the seeds of divine knowledge."xiv Elsewhere described as "implanted knowledge" 
(Ef.1¢uTo5 yvw015 ), xv these seeds are linked especially to the by-now-familiar ability to 
distinguish ethical contraries: "you [God] gave, with respect to [Adam's] soul, rational 
discernment, ability to distinguish piety and impiety, (and] observation ofjust and 
unjust."'v' Thus, in a manner quite analogous to Cicero's "implanted reason," this work 
describes the inchoate natural law, conceptualized as an aggregate of"implanted" "seeds 
of knowledge," as being itself an "implanted law." 
Methodius. 
Afragment from a work of Methodius preserved in the Panarion ofEpiphanius 
reveals a similar incorporation of this notion of an "implanted natural law" into the 
creation account of Genesis I, though in this case by way of Paul's discussion of"inner 
conflict" in Romans 7.'v;, According to Methodius, when Paul writes of his "delight in the 
law of God in my inmost self' (Rom 7:22), he is referring to the "implanted natural law" 
(Ef.I¢UT05 ¢uOIKO<; Vclf.I05) with which God endows all human beings.xviii With an eye to 
Rom 7:7-12, Methodius explains that, while Adam and Eve had once been free of 
"irrational desire" and the "enticing distractions of the pleasures," they were "infected 
with desire" when God commanded them not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil: "for once the commandment had been given, the devil got his opportunity to 
produce desire in me through the commandment." The result was that "the natural law 
within us" (o ev ~JltV ~UOIK05 VOJ105) was weakened "from its defeat by the desire in our 
bodies." God thus sent his son to condemn sin to destruction, "so that the requirement of 
the law of nature would be fulfilled," and the human being restored to "its original nature 
before its fall," which is to say, "the rational image of God."xix 
Justin Martyr. 
A final example, the Second Apology of Justin Martyr, makes more explicit use 
ofthe developmental aspect of this Stoic theory in the service of its Christian apologetic 
than does Methodius. In App 13.2, Justin expresses his wish to be considered only as a 
Christian despite his Platonic background 
not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because 
they are not in all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, the Stoics, 
and poets, and historians. 
He proceeds to explain this partial agreement of Greek and Christian thought: 
For each man [among those Greek thinkers just mentioned] spoke well in 
proportion to his share of the divine spermatic logos, seeing what was related to it 
. . . For all the writers were able to see realities darkly by means of the implanted 
seed of the logos which was in them (oH:l: rR5 evouOT]5 EJl~uTou rov !-oyou 
orropas).xx 
In contrast to the mere "seed" of the divine logos possessed by such earlier great thinkers, 
Christians, according to Justin, have access to the complete logos by virtue of their 
knowledge of the teaching of Christ, who was himself the embodiment of "right reason," 
and whose teaching (he tells us elsewhere in the work) thus represents "the law of nature" 
( o TRs- ~UOEW5 VOJl05 ). xxi This contrast emerges elsewhere as Justin attributes the past 
persecutions of philosophers and the present Christian persecution to the same demonic 
source. 
And those of the Stoic school- since, so far as their moral teaching went, they 
were admirable, as were also the poets in some particulars, on account ofthe seed 
of reason implanted in every race of men (o1a TO Ef1¢urov rravr\ yeve1 
av8pwrrwv OITEp[Ja TOV Aoyou)- [those Stoics] were, we know, hated and put 
to death ... For, as we intimated, the devils have always effected, that all those 
who in any case are zealous to live according to logos and shun vice, be hated. 
And it is no wonder if the devils are proved to cause those to be much worse 
hated who live not according to a part only of the spermatic Logos, but by the 
knowledge and contemplation of the whole Logos, which is Christ.xxii 
In both of these passages, the application of the term "implanted" (eiJ¢uros-) to 
the logos itself- more precisely, to the "seed" of the logos- is analogous to its use in 
both the Apostolic Constitutions and Cicero's On Laws. Strikingly, Justin uses this term 
particularly with reference to the divine and yet incomplete logos that is possessed by all 
human beings. He emphasizes this incomplete state, moreover, by means of the "seed" 
metaphor that is commonly associated with the "implanted preconceptions." The 
developmental process that such language implies in these latter works, however, has 
undergone a radical alteration in the context of Justin's Logos theory: the process by 
which the logos is completed has been removed from the sphere of individual human 
development and projected onto the stage of history. The attainment of right reason and 
life in accord with "the law of nature" is not simply a matter of intellectual effort; such a 
life is entirely impossible apart from the full revelation of the logos in the person and 
teaching of Jesus Christ. 
Conclusion. 
The repeated use ofthe term "implanted" to describe either human reason 
or the natural law it comprises in works otherwise so different in date, provenance and 
thought as Cicero's On Laws, the Apostolic Constitutions, Justin's 2 Apology and the 
Methodius fragment can only be explained in terms oftheir common dependence upon a 
philosophical usage rooted in the Stoic theory of law. This usage was apparently 
sufficiently well-known in Dionysius's day that he could- with neither comment nor 
apology- simply identify James's "implanted logos" as natural law. And this, I would 
argue, is precisely how it should be interpreted. 
The Adaptation of a Philosophical Concept in James 
As was mentioned at the outset of this paper, James's dependence upon Greek 
philosophical ideas for his concept of an "implanted logos" has generally been rejected 
due to the fact that James speaks of this logos in ways scarcely typical of Stoic 
discussions of human reason. To be sure, such differences are quite significant. But the 
facile conclusion that James- alone among the ancient sources treated above- has 
formulated an equation of"implanted logos" with a law that is both perfect and (in good 
Stoic fashion!) "of freedom," betrays a much too simplistic approach to the complex 
problem of the synthesis of Jewish, Christian and Greek traditions in the early Christian 
literature. As is clear from the Apostolic Constitutions, Methodius and Justin, the 
incorporation of this Stoic concept into religious ideas with which it was not originally 
associated resulted in many and various deviations from the Stoic theory as originally 
conceived. If James speaks of the implanted logos in ways that are not typical of 
Stoicism, neither is James a typical Stoic! 
James's use of language of"hearing and doing" in connection with this logos is in 
fact quite instructive in this respect. Being a"logos-doer" in James's sense is clearly not a 
Stoic expression. As has often been pointed out, the phrase TTOif)T~S' Aoyov would most 
likely conjure up images of an orator or poet in classical Greek usage. The use of TTOI Ew 
(as is obviously the case in James) of one who carries out, or is obedient to logos, is a 
semitism, and is thus typical of Jewish and Christian, not Stoic, literature. In Jewish and 
Christian tradition, moreover, "doing" in this sense is often paired, as in James, with 
"hearing." By the same token, this pair of terms is typically used in the Jewish and 
Christian literature with reference to ethical instruction, and particularly in connection 
with "hearing and doing" the law, as in Rom 2:13: "it is not the hearers ofthe law who 
are righteous in God's sight, but the doers of the law who will be justified." Similarly, the 
author of James himself elsewhere speaks directly of the TTOIT)T~5 v6~ou (4: 11-12) rather 
than, as in I:22, ofthe doer of the logos which is also law. If, then, James's notion that 
the "implanted logos" can be "heard" and "done" thus derives ultimately from Jewish 
rather than Stoic tradition, his use of this language nonetheless confirms at the same time 
that he, quite like the Stoics, thinks of this logos precisely as a law. 
That is to say, this passage simultaneously points to a significant similarity and a 
significant difference between James and those who originally coined the expression 
e~¢uros- f..oyos-. Both associate it with the perfect law, but in James the understanding of 
that law is informed by Jewish and Christian tradition: the divine law conceived by the 
Stoics was, according to James, legislated by the God of Jewish and Christian tradition-
whom he, significantly, in fact describes as "lawgiver" (4:12). And ifthe author of James 
assumes that this logos can be "heard" and, in some sense, "received" (cf. I:21 ), this 
indicates only that he, like other Jewish and Christian authors who adapted the Stoic 
theory of natural law for their own purposes, understands it, though internal to the human 
individual, to have some external form as well. 
Similarly, the notion that this logos "is able to save souls" (1:21) is well 
understood in light of the author's expectation of an eschatological judgment to be 
executed in accord with the "law of freedom" (Jas 2: 12). Such a belief in a final judgment 
is of course quite frequent in the early Christian literature, and analogous expectations are 
in fact found on the part of both Justin and Methodius, whose simultaneous dependence 
on the Stoic theory of law was discussed above. 
If, then, these aspects of James's treatment of the "implanted logos" in no way tell 
against its dependence upon this philosophical idea, they do, nonetheless, give rise to a 
number of interesting questions. If this internal natural law has some external form, what 
is it? What particular law, that is, does James consider to be "perfect" and "of freedom"? 
And ifthat which "saves souls" is inborn in all people by nature, what, precisely, is the 
role of Jesus Christ (l: l; 2: l)? 
'The close relationship between the "implanted logos" and the "perfect law of freedom" is 
generally recognized by interpreters, many of whom in fact argue that the two are identical. Among the 
most recent and extended treatments are R. Fabris, Legge della Liberto in Giacomo (Supplementi alia 
Rivista Biblica 8; Brescia: Paideia, 1977); M. Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz: Eine Untersuchung zum 
Verstdndnis von "Wort" und "Gesetz'' in israelitisch{ruhjudischen und neutestamentlichen Schriften. 
Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Jakobusbriefes. (Europaische Hochschulschriften 23/502; 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994); M. Klein, "Ein vollkommenes Werk": Vol/kommenheit, Gesetz und 
Gerich! als theo/ogische Themen des Jakobusbriefes (BWANT 7/19; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1995). See 
now also M. Jackson-McCabe, Logos and Law in the Letter ofJames: The Law ofNature, the Law of 
Moses and the Law ofFreedom (NovTSup 100; Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2001), which gives a much more 
detailed treatment of the issues presented here. 
" For the relevant Oecumenius passage, see MPG 119. 468; for Theophylactus see MPG 125. 
1145. 
;;, I. Sedlacek, Dionysius bar Salibi in Apocalypsim, Actus et Epistu!as Catholicas (CSCO, 
Scriptores Syri 2/101; Rome: de Luigi, 1910), 91. l translate Sedlacek's Latin rendering ofDionysius's 
Syriac. 
"Dionysius, in fact, remarks that he had no earlier complete treatments ofthe Catholic Epistles 
(including James) at his disposal. 
' Throughout this paper l refer to the letter and its author as James. The latter is done merely for 
the sake of convenience, and is not intended to reflect my advocacy of any particular theory of authorship. 
,; Representative in this regard is M. Dibelius, James: ACommentary on the Epistle ofJames (ll'h 
ed., rev. by H. Greeven; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 113. 
'" P. H. Davids, The Epistle ofJames.· A Commentary on the Greek Text (N!GTC; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdman's, 1982) 95. 
'"' This section presents in compressed and summary form what has been argued in detail in 
Jackson-McCabe, Logos and Law in the Letter ofJames, ch. 2. 
;, For example, by Cicero; see the following note. 
'De Leg. 1.26-27; see further on this Jackson-McCabe, Logos and Law in the Letter ofJames, 73-
75. 
·"On the question of the source ofCicero's De Legibus, see L. P. Kenter, M Tullius Cicero, De 
Legibus. A Commentary on Book I (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972) 9-10. 
,;; For a convenient collection and translation of the passages, see D. A. Fiensy and D. R. Darnell, 
"Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers," in J. H. Charlesworth, ed., The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 2. 671-97. For the Greek text, see F.X. Funk, Didascalia et Constitutiones 
Apostolorum (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1905). 
'"' AposCon 8.12.25.  
'" AposCon 8.12.18; cf. 8.9.8; further 7.26.3; 6.20.  
"AposCon 7.33.3. 
"' AposCon 8. 12. 17. 
,,; For the Greek text, seeK. Holl, Epiphanius (Anocratus and Panarion), vol. 2: Panarion: Haer. 
34-64 (GCS; Leipzig: Heinrichs, 1922). For an English translation, see F. Williams, The Panarion of 
EpiphaniusofSalamis.· Books II and III (Sects 47-80, De Fide) (NHMS 36; Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
,,;,Pan. 4.60.5-6. 
"'Cf. Pan. 4.41 .6 with 4.27.8. 
"App. 13.3, 5. 
"'See Second Apology 2, where the teaching of Christ is associated with both "right reason" and 
"natural law." 
"" App. 8. 1-3. 
